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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
JEFFREY DON IRELAND, : Case No. 20021053-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in interpreting the term "consumption" 
within the definition of "possession or use" under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd) as 
including the body's physiological metabolism of a substance. Interpreting consumption 
to include the physiological metabolism of a substance in the body unconstitutionally 
shifts the burden of proof of jurisdiction to a defendant. In addition, the usual and 
commonly accepted meaning of the word consumption only includes the initial act of 
introducing a substance into the body. Therefore, Appellant respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse his conviction. 
POINT I. INTERPRETING CONSUMPTION TO INCLUDE THE 
PHYSIOLOGICAL METABOLISM OF A SUBSTANCE IN THE BODY 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFTS THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF 
JURISDICTION TO A DEFENDANT. 
Appellant argued in his opening brief that due process requires the state prove that 
at least some of the controlled substance ingested was consumed in Utah. The state 
declined to address Appellant's argument stating that "the trial court did not find 
jurisdiction under a theory that the presence of methamphetamine in defendant's blood 
supported an inference that he introduced methamphetamine into his body while in 
Utah." Appellee Brief 5. However, by accepting the state's argument that consumption 
is "an ongoing process" which includes the physiological metabolism of a substance, the 
trial court determined that "the State need not prove where defendant ingested the 
methamphetamine." R. 207. The trial court's determination necessarily created an 
unconstitutional inference or presumption which effectively relieved the state of its 
burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that at least some of a controlled 
substance was consumed in Utah. See State v. Sorenson. 758 P.2d 466, 470 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). As argued in Appellant's opening brief, "reliance on such inferences or 
presumptions unconstitutionally shifts the 'burden of proof on the fact of jurisdiction to 
[a] defendant in violation of the due process clause of Article I Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.'" Sorenson, 758 P.2d at 470; Appellant's Opening Brief 8-12. 
The state also argues that Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 is not applicable because "'the 
state conceded that it could not prove that the offense of consumption was committed in 
Utah by virtue of an odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath." See Appellee Brief 12. 
However, Sorenson never argued that he did not consume alcohol, in fact, the state's 
claim that the evidence that Sorenson had consumed alcohol was not "[]contradicted" by 
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the defendant. Sorenson, 758 P.2d at 467. Instead, Sorenson argued that the state had to 
prove that he "consumed alcohol within the state" and the court could not rely on the 
state's theory that "there exists a presumption that consumption occurred in Utah unless 
rebutted by other credible evidence." IcL This Court agreed concluding the "offense of 
consumption necessarily requires proof [by a preponderance of the evidence] of the 
jurisdictional factor that at least some alcohol was consumed in Utah." IcL_ at 470. This 
Court held that the presumption or assumption used by the trial court that"Sorenson's 
failure to offer some explanation that the alcohol was not consumed in Utah created an 
inference that the drinking occurred near the scene of arrest" relieved the state of its 
burden to show jurisdiction in violation of due process. IcL at 467. 
The facts in Sorenson are directly analogous to this case. In this case, Mr. Ireland 
was charged with "possession or use by consumption." R. 1-3, 83. "Beyond [Mr. 
Ireland's] presence in Utah at [the] time, the State ha[d] no certain proof of the location 
where defendant ingested the drug." R. 206. Notwithstanding this lack of proof, the trial 
court adopted the state's theory that consumption is "an ongoing process" which includes 
the "physiological metabolism of the substance [in the body]." R. 206. The trial court 
determined that given consumption is an ongoing process, the state was not required to 
prove where Mr. Ireland ingested the substance. R. 207. The trial court's conclusion 
was based on an unconstitutional presumption that "it is reasonable to infer" given this 
"process" that Mr. Ireland "ingested the substance within Utah." R. 85. The trial court's 
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presumption, like the one in Sorenson, relieved the state of its burden to show 
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence in violation of Mr. Ireland's due process 
rights. 
POINT II. THE USUAL AND COMMONLY ACCEPTED MEANING 
OF CONSUMPTION ONLY INCLUDES THE INITIAL ACT OF 
INTRODUCING A SUBSTANCE INTO THE BODY. 
The state argues that "consistent with the rules of statutory construction 
'consumption' must mean something other than the mere introduction of a substance into 
the body." Appellee Brief 8. However, as argued by Appellant in his opening brief, the 
ordinary sense of the term "consumption" as used in conjunction with the other terms 
defining "possession or use" does not suggest the continuous processing of a substance 
being metabolized within the body. See Appellant's Brief 14-21. 
"Each term in a statute should be interpreted according to its usual and commonly 
accepted meaning. We presume that words are used in their ordinary sense" State v. 
Paul 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In 
addition, "courts typically construe statutes on the assumption that 'each term is used 
advisedly and that the intent of the Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the 
context and structure in which it is placed.'" IcL at 994 (emphasis added). The usual and 
commonly accepted meaning of the word "consumption" includes only those acts of 
initially introducing a substance into the body. The ordinary sense of the term is obvious 
when viewing the placement of the term "consumption" within the statute in relation to 
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the other descriptive terms surrounding it which only describe ways a substance is 
introduced into the body. As outlined in Appellant's Opening Brief, "application, 
inhalation, swallowing, injection, [and] consumption" are all present tense terms that 
only describe the act of introducing a substance into the body. See Appellant's Opening 
Brief 12-15. Contrary to the state's claim, these terms do not exhaust the ways in which 
a controlled substance can be introduced into the body but even if they did "where 
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, appellate courts cannot look beyond the 
language to divine legislative intent, but must construe the statute according to its plain 
language." IcL at 993; see also Appellee Brief 8. Since the statutory language limits 
consumption to the act of introducing a substance into the body, the trial court erred in 
concluding that "consumption" is an ongoing process which includes the physiological 
metabolism of a substance in the body. 
The state cites State v. Sorensen, 2003 UT App 292, an unpublished 
memorandum decision as support for its proposition that "Utah's statute defining 
possession of a controlled substance clearly includes inhalation, swallowing, injection, 
or consumption.'" IcL Appellant agrees that the statute defines possession in that manner, 
however, the decision in Sorensen has no application in this case. See Grand County v. 
Rogers, 2002 UT 25, ^ 14, 44 P.3d 734 ("A memorandum decision may not be used to 
render a decision in any matter not clearly and unequivocally disposed of on the basis of 
well-established Utah case law or Utah statute). Because Sorensen is an unpublished 
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memorandum decision "sufficient background to understand fully the reasoning and 
decision reached by [this Court] in rendering its" decision is absent. Grand County . 2002 
UT 25 at TJ8. Sorensen therefore cannot be applied to resolve this issue. Further, "when 
the reasoning is new, or novel, or has not previously been applied to a matter of the type 
on appeal, [relying on] a memorandum decision is inappropriate." Id. at [^14. ("In the 
case of a statute, care should be used to ensure that first impression analysis of a statute, 
or unique application of a statute, be delivered in an opinion, not a memorandum 
decision." Id. at [^14 n.3). The interpretation of the term "consumption" within Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1 )(dd) as including the physiological metabolism of a substance in 
the body has not been previously applied to convict an individual of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a). Nor does 
Sorensen resolve this issue. Accordingly, Sorensen does not apply. 
In addition, Sorensen is a bindover case where the state was required to "show 
probable cause . . . by presenting sufficient evidence to establish that the crime charged 
ha[d] been committed and that the defendant committed it." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 
TflO, 20 P.3d 300 (internal quotations and citations omitted). At the preliminary hearing 
stage, "the evidence required to show probable cause . . . is relatively low" where "'the 
magistrate must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution.'" IJL (quotations and citation 
omitted). By comparison, more evidence is required by the state in order to meet its 
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burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-501(3) (1999); see also Clark. 2001 UT 9 at Ifl 1 ("The probable cause 
standard is lower . . . than a preponderance of the evidence standard."). Even if Sorensen 
were read to hold that evidence of a controlled substance in the body established 
probable cause of possession, it does not mean it is enough to establish proof of 
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, in Sorensen, it does not 
appear that jurisdiction was at issue. Therefore, Sorensen is inapposite. 
If this Court were to adopt the state's theory, the state would never have to prove 
jurisdiction in these types of cases because anyone with a controlled substance in his 
blood would be continuously guilty of "possession or use" until his body completely 
metabolized the substance. However, due process requires more than establishing 
jurisdiction based on a presumption or inference that a crime was committed within the 
state. See Sorenson, 758 P.2d at 468. As further set forth in the opening Brief of 
Appellant, the trial court's ruling on jurisdiction was erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Ireland respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse his conviction. 
SUBMITTED this u>**> day of May, 2004. 
7 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, DEBRA M. NELSON, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered 
eight copies of the foregoing to the Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office, 349 
South 200 East, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this iff* day of May, 2004 . 
^ /£ / i _ 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's 
Office as indicated above this day of May, 2004. 
8 
